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This paper uses primary data to analyze the institutions and informal markets that 
govern groundwater allocation in the principal sugarcane belt of North India. In 
contrast to earlier literature, we find that the observed water trades result in efficient 
water allocation across farms. We interpret this and other stylized facts in terms of a 
simple bargaining model with limited inter-player transfers. Poor functioning of the 
power sector leads to reduced pumping and a water supply constraint. Simulations 
show that power supply reform can significantly increase farm yields, be financed out 
of the increased farm profits, and provide an instrument to use for attaining 
intertemporal efficiency in water allocation.  
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1  Introduction 
Amidst rapidly growing economic activity in India, there are increasing concerns of 
water scarcity, and of declining groundwater tables in particular. In North India, successful 
agricultural growth in the past few decades has been accompanied by a massive expansion of 
groundwater irrigation. The popularity of water intensive crops (such as rice and sugarcane) is 
said to be responsible for decreasing groundwater tables, raising concerns about the efficiency 
and sustainability of groundwater use. This has in turn given rise to a debate on whether market 
institutions for water engender optimal and/or equitable water allocations, and, relatedly, on the 
role of the widely prevalent system of flat-rate (lump sum) electricity pricing in contributing to 
inefficient water use in agriculture. 
These concerns provide the backdrop for the present study, which characterizes the 
institutions that govern water allocation in a typical village setting in North India with deep and 
declining water tables, and draws inferences for the design of instruments that may facilitate 
efficient water use.  In particular, we examine whether the informal water markets that operate in 
this village economy are monopolistic in nature and therefore lead to inefficient outcomes, as is 
argued in much of the literature. We conclude that the water trading that we observe is better 
viewed as part of a social contract; and that this contract results in a spatially efficient allocation 
of water.  
Next, based on our characterization of the water transactions in this village, we use 
simulations to analyze the impact of an electricity pricing and delivery regime different than the 
  1present one, on yields and on the sustainability of water use. We find that policy reform in the 
power sector can significantly improve crop yields by allowing farmers to control the volume 
and timing of irrigations. Related work beyond this paper shows that such reform can enable 
pricing electricity in order that pumping groundwater is implicitly taxed, at a rate that delivers 
intertemporally efficient water use. Thus we argue that the policy focus should shift from worries 
about water allocation within villages to policy reform in pricing and delivering electricity that 
powers groundwater extraction. 
The paper is based on data collected in a primary survey in Tabelagarhi, a village located 
in the sugarcane belt in Western Uttar Pradesh, India. The survey was carried out over an entire 
crop-cycle of about a year in 2004-05. 
The broad North Indian agricultural belt has a water economy that shares the institutional 
features observed in Tabelagarhi. These include predominant or exclusive use of groundwater for 
irrigation, and a low and declining water table that makes it uneconomical to use diesel to fuel 
the pumps that run tubewells. The pumps thus use electricity to draw water from depths of 70 
feet and below. However, cultivation is heavily influenced by the erratic and inadequate State 
supplied electricity; this translates into inadequacy in the supply of irrigation water. As a 
consequence, cultivation is also adversely affected (e.g. Pant, 2004).  
Further, fragmented landholdings, wide variation in plot sizes, and the high costs of 
boring wells and installing pumps imply that many plots, particularly smaller ones, do not have 
tubewells.  As a result, purchase of water from informal markets is common.  
Finally, in this region, a uniform water price per hour of tubewell use is set in an 
informal village-level agreement at the beginning of the season. This price does not vary across 
the season in response to varying power (and therefore water) availability, to clear the market. 
  2Consequently, water selling farmers can only adjust the quantity of water sales over the season. 
Even though tubewells service only nearby plots to prevent seepage losses from unlined 
channels, we do not find evidence of monopoly power; we argue below that using traditional 
categories of market structure to explain water sales from tubewell owners is not illuminating. 
While details are set out in subsequent sections, we provide here a brief preview of our 
results.  We find: 
(i)  Direct evidence that power shortage rations water supply.  
(ii)  The water shortage results in the marginal value product of water (MVPW) on 
tubewell owners’ plots being significantly higher than the water price they get from 
selling water.  A water price-taking, profit maximizing tubewell owner should then 
prefer, on the margin, to add water to his own plots rather than sell water.   
(iii)  Yet, tubewell owners sell significant quantities of water. We conclude that models 
that treat tubewell owners as profit-maximizing water-selling ‘firms’ are an 
inadequate description of the sugarcane belt of North India, at least. Instead, we infer, 
and model, the existence of a social contract, that determines both water price as well 
as water allocation across plots in the village.  The contract is a response to   
fragmented holdings and the high cost of boring wells and installing pumpsets; this 
induces farmers to irrigate their multiple plots with a combination of own tubewells 
and water purchased from others’ tubewells.   
(iv)  In fact, the social contract results in a spatially-efficient allocation of water: that is, 
reallocating the available water across plots would not increase output by much. This 
is a striking result, standing in sharp contrast with much of the literature, (such as 
Shah (1993), Meinzen-Dick (1996), and Jacoby, Murgai and Rahman (2004)) which 
  3has tended to find allocative inefficiency and attributed it to the presence of 
monopoly power of tubewell owners.  
(v)  However, notwithstanding the social contract, inadequate power extracts a toll. In 
simulations that provide a lower bound, we show that in the presence of adequate 
electricity, simulated yields are up to 9% higher than sample yields. Inadequate power 
supply is largely a consequence of the present system of a flat electricity charge 
unrelated to the quantum of electricity used. We find that unit pricing to cover the 
marginal cost of power is more expensive, but the reliable power supply that results 
induces increased yields and farm profits that can more than pay for such pricing. 
(vi)  Questions of sustainable groundwater use in this region are closely connected with 
those of intertemporal efficiency of water extraction from an aquifer with recharge. 
We cannot directly address intertemporal issues; however, our analysis shows that 
since water is in effect rationed at present, simulated irrigation volumes even with 
substantially higher electricity prices are 6% to 12.5% greater than in the sample, 
implying a somewhat higher rate of aquifer depletion. We briefly refer to some of our 
related work that provides estimates of markups on the economic cost of electricity 
that can lead to intertemporally efficient water use.  
This study contributes to the substantial literature that examines questions of groundwater 
market structure, water allocation and attending issues related to efficiency and equity in South 
Asia, which includes, in addition to Jacoby, Murgai and Rahman (2004), Shah (1993) and 
Meinzen-Dick (1996) cited above, Palmer-Jones (1994), Dhawan (1995), Meinzen-Dick (2000), 
Sengupta (2000), Dubash (2002), Foster and Rosenzweig (2005)
1. While informative on many 
issues, none of them contains the kind of estimation required to quantify the extent of water 
  4misallocation and simulate alternative policy environments, as we do in the present paper. Many 
of them measure price-cost margins for water, but do not structurally estimate its demand and 
supply. In fact, we show that using a price-cost margin for water extraction as an indicator of the 
extent of allocative inefficiency can be misleading, in a setting where tubewell owners are 
themselves water users, and water is rationed.  Also, none of the studies above on India measures 
water prices volumetrically, making comparisons of even basic information such as marginal 
values of water difficult; (a recent exception is Somanathan and Ravindranath (2006)). Finally, 
unlike much of the literature, this paper models and finds empirical support for the existence of a 
social contract that governs water transactions; our analysis of its efficiency can inform the 
debate about the nature of local institutions in other environmental and development contexts.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the study area and the 
data. Section 3 analyzes the water allocation across plots observed in the data, and provides 
evidence of widespread water rationing. It then argues that observing water sales in the presence 
of such rationing points to the existence of a social contract governing water transactions. 
Section 4 proposes a simple model of this social contract, which predicts, among other things, 
that water allocation across plots will be efficient. Section 5.1 analyzes the data to show that 
allocative efficiency is a good approximation of the village water economy. Section 5.2 discusses 
simulations that quantify the effect of a comprehensive change in power policy involving unit-





                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 See Schoengold and Zilberman (2005) for an excellent survey on the economics of water.  
  52   Village Survey and Stylized Facts 
 2.1 Survey   
Our analysis is based on a detailed village-level survey we conducted over the course of 
ten months. Our study site is Tabelagarhi village, in Baghpat district, selected from a 'dark' 
block
2 in the sugarcane belt of Western Uttar Pradesh
3. By and large groundwater is the only 
source of irrigation for crops grown in this area, and the water table in this area has witnessed a 
steady decline over the last few decades.  
Tabelagarhi has 165 cultivating households, all of whom cultivate sugarcane. The crop is 
irrigation intensive, requiring one irrigation pre-sowing, and regular irrigations thereafter. To 
construct our sample, we first conducted a census of all households and tubewells in the village.  
We then took a random sample of 73 tubewells (out of a village total of about 110), chosen 
primarily from the main cultivating areas north and east of the village, roughly in proportion to 
the total numbers of tubewells located in those directions. We identified all the plots serviced by 
these tubewells; these plots belong to 105 farmers. We then built the sample so that all 326 plots 
cultivated by these 105 farmers were included. Including all plots serviced by a tubewell implies 
that we can compute the total amount of water discharged by each tubewell over the season, 
from plot-level irrigation data; we also obtain, for each tubewell, the entire water allocation from 
it to various plots. This enables us to pose counterfactuals about the effect of reallocating this 
volume of water across plots serviced by each tubewell. 
Data were collected at three levels: tubewell, plot, and farm household. Tubewell data 
(including the depth of the tubewell, capacity of the motor, tubewell discharge, maintenance 
costs and history) helps to estimate water supply characteristics. Plot-specific data (including 
                                                           
2 Dark blocks are defined as areas where the quantum of groundwater used exceeds 85% of recharge.  
3 Sugarcane and rice are the two most water intensive crops widely cultivated in North India. 
  6details on source of irrigation, date of each irrigation, the number of hours the pumpset was run 
to deliver water, the terms of the water transaction, information on labor and other inputs, and 
soil quality) is needed to estimate the demand for irrigation water. Farm household data 
(including information on household members, and their education levels, and farm assets) can 
potentially help to identify farmer-specific effects on production. Field work was conducted once 
every two to three weeks, over the entire sugarcane cycle (2004-2005). This frequency 
corresponded to the pattern of irrigations; and given the large number of plots to be tracked, 
helped in keeping the recall period low
4.   
2.2  Principal Features of the Study Village 
  The village, as is the norm in Western Uttar Pradesh, is subject to erratic power supply. 
In May, power supply averaged 6-7 hours a day, this went up to 8-10 hours in June, and came 
down to 3-5 hours in July (these three months saw no rainfall).  Conversations with experts and 
farmers at the site indicate that pre-monsoon irrigations are particularly crucial for plant growth. 
In 2004, the monsoon was delayed, and there was no rain in June and July. In this situation, one 
irrigation every 20 days was desirable. The lack of regular electricity supply meant that for those 
who irrigated using purchased water, irrigation got delayed due to poor power supply as priority 
was given to plots on which tubewells were situated.  
(1).Water transactions, Fragmented Holdings, and the Pattern of Irrigation: All 73 
tubewells in our sample run on electricity, but vary significantly in the technology employed to 
lift water. In particular, 29 of the pumpsets are ‘submersible’ and the rest are ‘non-submersible.’ 
                                                           
4 We obtained assistance from the Water Technology Centre, Indian Agricultural Research Institute for 
determining irrigation volumes, and from the National Bureau of Soil Surveys and Land Use Planning in collecting 
and analyzing soil samples. 
  7Submersible pumps are much more expensive to purchase
5. For areas with low water tables, they 
are however the desired technology to possess. As shown in Table 1.1, on average for our 
sample, a submersible takes approximately 90 minutes to irrigate one bigha (1 bigha roughly 
equals one-fifth of an acre), whereas a non-submersible takes about 2 hours. The costs of 
operating tubewells include the cost of electricity and maintenance costs. Electricity cost is an 
annual charge, based on the horsepower of the pump (Rupees 70 per month per horsepower). 
Submersibles not only have higher discharges, but are less prone to break-downs and have lower 
maintenance costs.  
Table 1.2 presents the pattern of irrigation, contrasting plots that are served by purchased 
water, with those using their own tubewells. The average plot size in the two categories is 8.7 
and 4.7 bighas respectively, so that plots that rely on purchased water are much smaller than 
those that use an owned tubewell. The overall number of irrigations favors plots that were 
watered through an owned tubewell; fewer irrigations were given to plots which rely on 
purchased water. More than the number of irrigations, their timing is crucial for plant growth. A 
key indication that plots that purchased water could not time their irrigations as well as others is 
the fact that in the dry summer months, a much lower percentage of these plots managed to 
complete the recommended 5 irrigations.  
As in much of India, a common feature of the village is the fragmentation of farmers’ holdings. 
There are about 3 plots per farmer, on average; these are typically located in 2 (and sometimes 
more) non-contiguous fragments. Farmers generally do not install tubewells on all of their plots 
and participate on both sides of the water market. In the sample, 92% of the farmers who 
                                                           
5 A submersible pump has a hermetically-sealed motor, is submerged in the water, and has a greater lifting force as 
it does not rely on external air pressure for lifting water. 
  8purchased water to irrigate one or more plots, also sold water from a tubewell located on one of 
their other plots. 
(2). Price of Water: A water price is set at the beginning of the season, as a result of a social 
consensus. The price is set in rupees per hour of use of a tubewell (Rs.15/hour in the data set), 
and holds for all water transactions in the village over the entire season; water buyers and sellers 
are price takers subsequent to this price being set. This apparent uniformity of prices has been 
noted elsewhere, and is cited as evidence that prices are determined as an outcome of a social 
contract.
6  
We calculate the price of water per unit volume charged by a tubewell by dividing Rs. 15 
by the measured volume of water that the tubewell discharges per hour. While the average price 
per bigha-inch (about 20.56 cubic meters) of water across all tubewells is Rs.6.50,
7 variation in 
tubewell discharge translates into substantial variation around this mean, with the 25
th and 75
th 
percentiles being Rs. 4.70 and 8 respectively. Submersible pumps discharge much more water 
than non-submersibles, so the volumetric prices of water from tubewells with submersibles are 
significantly lower.   
(3). Sugarcane Yields, Soil Quality and Other Inputs: Table 1.3 summarizes yields of 
sugarcane by category of plot, to examine whether the pattern of irrigation volume and timing is 
reflected in differential yields. As one might expect given the summary statistics on irrigation, 
yields are lower on plots with purchased water but the differences are not substantial. 
These differences in yields are, of course, mediated not just by the amount of irrigation, 
but by soil quality and other inputs as well.  As noted earlier, soil samples were collected from  
                                                           
6 See for example Dubash (2002).  
 
  9each  plot (from different corners and then mixed) and analyzed.  The soils in these areas are of 
good quality; about two-thirds of the plots in Tabelagarhi may be classified as “sandy loam”, and 
another 22% as loam,
8  but the difference in yields between the two categories of plots is not 
large. 
Summary statistics for the other major inputs are presented in Table 2.  With labor, all 
activities are summed across by type of activity (land preparation and sowing, weeding and 
digging, applications of irrigation and other inputs, tying of cane, harvesting) and by type of 
labor (hired casual labor and permanent labor, contractual labor, household labor, labor in 
exchange and other miscellaneous forms). Aggregate labor use by category of plot suggests that 
plots which purchase water are slightly more labor intensive. 
Tractors are primarily used at the time of pre-sowing for land preparation, and for 
sowing. Oxen are also used for these activities; in addition, they are used for transporting 
sugarcane to sugar depots at harvest time. While oxen were used on almost all plots, tractors 
were used on about half of them. Tractors tend to be used on the larger-sized plots. 
3   Water Allocation Across Plots 
  We investigate two questions related to the water allocation across plots observed in our 
sample – whether water is rationed, and whether its allocation across plots is inefficient. We 
discuss mainly the evidence on the first question in this section, leaving a detailed exploration of 
allocative efficiency for Section 5.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 By way of comparison, this is a little greater than half of the average water price that Somanathan and 
Ravindranath (2006) estimate for water transactions in the Papagni watershed in the southern states of Andhra 
Pradesh and Karnataka. 
8  Loamy soils are better, as they contain sand and silt in proportionate amounts, and are well drained.  In contrast 
sandy loam soils are worse, in that these are coarse-textured, and typically require more irrigations. The remaining 
10% of the plots are classified as clay loam, loamy sand, and silt loam. In terms of productivity, however, the impact 
of soil quality is discernible, if at all, only for plots using bought water, where yields on loam soils are 6 quintal per 
bigha higher than on sandy loam soils. 
  103.1 Evidence of water rationing: Since electricity for pumping water is in short supply, it is 
possible that that there is quantity rationing of water on plots, as the price of water is fixed for 
the season. We use therefore the following natural notion of water rationing, (one which is also 
consistent with our model of Section 4). A water buying plot i is water rationed if its MVPW 
exceeds the marginal cost of water extraction: i.e. if  , where  is the estimated unit 
cost of water extraction for the tubewell supplying plot i,   is the sugarcane price, and   is the 
estimated MPW (marginal product of water) for the plot. In order to make an inference about the 
existence of a social contract, we also compare the MVPW on a plot with the water price: i.e. 
whether for plot i  ; where   is the water price for the plot  (equal to the per hour 
village water price divided by the discharge of the tubewell which supplies plot i).   
t i s c a p ˆ ˆ > t c ˆ
s p i a ˆ
iJ i s q a p ) ( ˆ < > iJ q
  We estimate plot-level marginal product of water as the partial derivative of an estimated 
production function with respect to the water input on the plot; to determine whether rationing is 
significant, we derive a confidence interval around the MPW using asymptotic theory (see 
Appendix). Separately, we estimate the unit cost of water extraction from each tubewell.  
(1). Estimating the sugarcane production technology and unit costs of water extraction:   
The estimation of a production function is facilitated by the considerable variation in 
inputs across plots, owing to variation in plot sizes, in volumetric water prices (as discharge rates 
vary across tubewells), and some variation in other input prices. As farmers in the data set have 
multiple plots, we use farmer dummies to deal with identification problems caused by 
unobserved, farmer-specific shocks.
9 We therefore estimate the equation 
                                                           
9 See Marschak and Andrews (1944), Griliches and Mairesse (1998), Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) on identification of production functions. Any production function estimation is susceptible to 
endogeneity, as the right-hand variables are objects of choice; these choices can depend on unobserved farmer-
specific and plot-specific characteristics and thus be correlated with the error term. Multiple plots per farmer enable 
us to to control for the former with a farmer-specific fixed effect. We also have detailed plot-specific soil quality 
data to control for the latter. In our empirical work, we found that conditional upon farmer-specific dummies, 
  11  i t i i b x f y ε β) , ( =                 ( 1 )  
where  is a farmer t-specific shock unobserved by the econometrician (farmer t cultivates plot 
i), which we can estimate using a dummy for farmer t; 
t b
i i i x y ε , , are, respectively output, a J-
dimensional input vector (of which the Jth input is water), and error on plot i, andβ  is a J-
dimensional parameter vector. Having experimented with several functional forms, we chose the 
flexible, Translog function as a starting point. We found that the Cobb-Douglas production 
function nested by the Translog works best.













) ln( ) ln(         ( 2 )  
where i indexes plots, t indexes farmers,  1 ) ln( 1 = i x , for all i,   1 = t d if plot i is cultivated by 
farmer  t, and is zero otherwise;  equals 1 if plot i has a rattoon c d
12 crop. The explanatory 
variables   are plot size, manure, fertilizer value, labor, tractor and oxen hours, and irrigation 
volume.  
ij x
Table 3 presents the Cobb-Douglas production function estimates. All coefficients except 
fertilizers have the expected sign and all but fertilizers and manure are significant. We also 
experimented with alternative specifications: using soil quality both as instruments and 
independent variables. These turn out to be insignificant and do not greatly affect other estimated 
coefficients, suggesting that the estimated MPWs are fairly robust. Appendix A.1 details the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
instruments such as soil quality variables and water price do not improve estimation. There is not enough variation 
in soil quality, while water prices are too weakly correlated with irrigation volumes. This last fact probably arises 
because under water rationing, the social contract allocates water efficiently across plots; so plots with different 
water prices can end up with similar irrigation volumes. 
10 We cannot reject the null that the higher order terms of the Translog are all zero. The F(1,281)-statistic 
corresponding to this evaluates to 0.82. The probability exceeding this value is 0.365.  
11 We also considered the von Liebig production function that often works well in plant experiments (e.g. Paris and 
Knapp(1989)). However, the von Liebig implies a cost function linear in input prices. This is rejected by our data, so 
we did not estimate this form of production function.  
  12construction of 95% confidence bands around the MPW estimates; we will infer that water on a 
plot is rationed if the unit cost of water extraction is less than MVPW, and lies outside the 
confidence band. 
The unit cost of water extraction from a tubewell does not depend on a charge for 
electricity, as that is a lump sum annual charge. But it depends on the number of pump 
breakdowns and the cost of repair per breakdown, since the number of such breakdowns is a 
function of the number of hours of tubewell operation. We model the number of breakdowns as a 
Poisson process, estimate the Poisson parameter from data on hours of operation and number of 
breakdowns for each pump. From this we derive tubewell-specific marginal cost of water 
extraction estimates, as detailed in Appendix A.2.  
(2). Comparing MVPW on plots to unit costs of water extraction:  Table 4 presents summary 
statistics of the derived plot level estimates of MPW, and the confidence bands.  For the sample 
overall, the average MVPW (the MPW times the sugarcane price of Rs. 102 per quintal) is about 
Rupees 16.6 per additional bigha-inch of water (as noted earlier, 1 bigha-inch of water equals 
about 20.6 cubic meters). On the other hand, the estimated Poisson parameter for non-
submersible and submersible pumpsets, respectively 0.002 and 0.0005, yield estimated marginal 
costs of extraction that average to Rs.1.45 and Rs.0.3 per bigha-inch for the two pumpset types. 
Comparing the MVPW on each plot with the marginal cost of extraction from the tubewell that 
supplied water to it, we find that the former is significantly higher for every plot. Thus there is 
pervasive water rationing. 
We also compare the MVPW for each plot with the tubewell-specific water price (Rs. 15 
divided by the tubewell discharge per hour) for the plot. The mean MVPW is about 2.5 times 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12 Rattoon refers to a second year stalk from planted sugarcane, grown by leaving the roots and part of the stalk 
intact in the soil during the first harvest.   
  13greater than the mean water price of Rs. 6.53 per bigha-inch; in fact, the MVPW is significantly 
larger than the water price for 308 of the 326 plots.  
Consider then a tubewell owner as a water selling farmer, as done in the earlier literature. 
In the sugarcane belt setting, this tubewell owner must take the water price p determined at the 
village level as given, and so must decide how much water to sell, and how much to use on his 
own plot. If the MVPW on his own plot exceeds the water price, we should not observe any 
water sales: for it is then more profitable to first apply an incremental unit of water on his own 
plot than to sell it. But in the data, we observe substantial water sales, along with MVPW on 
tubewell-owners’ plots being higher than the selling price of water
13.  We are led to conclude 
that, instead, a social contract operates and determines the water allocation: it is reasonable to 
assume that the water price and this allocation are jointly determined at the village level, as in the 
model of Section 4.  
We now provide a simple model of this social contract. The model predicts that water 
allocation from a tubewell to the plots served by it is efficient. In the subsequent section, we 
juxtapose this prediction with what analyzing the data tells us about allocative efficiency in the 
village.  
4    A Simple Model of the Village Social Contract 
The model described below takes into account the following stylized facts. A uniform water 
price is agreed upon in the village at the beginning of the season. Most farmers own land in 2 or 
more fragments, do not have tubewells on all their plots/fragments,
14 and are both buyers and 
sellers of water. Water is short due to power shortages. Tubewell owners sell water despite the 
                                                           
13 Plots with own tubewells are relatively less water-rationed. Table 4B shows that the mean MVPW for plots 
with own tubewell is Rupees 11.87, while for plots irrigated using purchased water it is Rupees 18.43. 
 
  14fact that the marginal value products of water on their own plots are significantly higher than the 
fixed water price that they receive from water sales. The allocation of water from a tubewell 
across plots served by it may not be significantly inefficient. 
The model of a social contract that we will use is one of village-wide bargaining over 
water allocation across plots and water price. Water allocation affects outputs and profits on each 
plot, and thus the size of the total village ‘pie’; while payments for water use result in a division 
of this pie across the farmers. In the village, who buys water from whom depends on plot 
locations, and this generally does not include reciprocal buyer-seller relationships between pairs 
of farmers. Rather, farmer A may be buying water from farmer B, who may be buying from 
farmer C, and so on; so village-wide bargaining captures negotiations better than bargaining 
within small groups of farmers. We will apply the N-player Nash Bargaining model.
15 Although 
this is a well-known model, we will explicitly map our village level features into it, for two 
reasons: (i) to provide predictions about water allocation that we should expect if the model is a 
reasonable approximation of village negotiations. (ii) The only transfers farmers make to each 
other is through payments for water use, at a single, common water price. It is useful to show 
how this affects the Pareto frontier and utility possibilities that farmers can attain. 
Suppose there are N farmers, and N ‘locations’. Farmer j has 2 plots, in locations j -1 and 
j ; so at each location j, there are 2 plots, owned by farmers j and j +1 (modulo N)
16. The 
particular choice of number of plots and pattern of plot ownership is purely for simplicity. 
Farmer j has a tubewell on his plot in location j but not on his plot in location j – 1, and his own 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 As mentioned before, borewells and pumps are expensive, some plots are small relative to tubewell capacity, and 
water from the tubewell of a neighboring farmer may be available. 
15 Nash(1950), Lensberg(1988).  Several non-cooperative bargaining models approximate the Nash Bargaining 
solution (e.g. Krishna and Serrano (1996)), so its use can be viewed as describing the outcome of an explicit 
bargaining process. The N-player version of Nash Bargaining ignores the possibility of the formation of coalitions of 
players, but in our setting, appears to capture village-wide agreement in a simple way.  
16 That is, N + 1 refers to farmer 1. 
  15tubewell is too distant to serve this latter plot. So for each j, irrigation on the 2 plots at location j 
depends on farmer j’s tubewell. The unit cost of water extraction is c (for simplicity constant 
across tubewells). Crop output depends on water input alone (for simplicity): farmer j’s outputs 
on his 2 plots are   and   respectively. (The first subscript refers to 
the farmer and the second to the location of the plot; for example,   is the amount of 
irrigation on farmer j’s plot in location j - 1;   is a plot-specific productivity for that plot). f 
is twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave, with positive first derivative; and water is 
an essential input. Let the sugarcane output price be normalized to 1, and let p denote water 
price.  
) ( jj jj w f A ) ( 1 , 1 , − − j j j j w f A
1 , − j j w
1 , − j j A
N
j j j jj w w 1 , 1 ) , ( = + , or simply  , will refer to a water allocation in the 
village; the expression within parentheses gives the water supplied by tubewell j to the plots of 
farmers j and j + 1 in location j. An agreement will be a tuple  ) consisting of a 
water price p and a water allocation that all farmers agree upon. Every feasible agreement gives 
each farmer a specific level of profit; (‘feasible’ water prices and water allocations will be 
defined later).   
j j j jj w w ) , ( , 1 +
j j j jj w w p ) , ( , ( , 1 +
(1). Water Allocation in the Absence of Rationing: We first show that in the absence of a 
(power shortage driven) water constraint, the water allocation in the Nash Bargaining solution 
would equate the marginal value product of water (MVPW) on each plot with the marginal cost 
of water extraction. The Nash Bargaining solution picks a point on the Pareto frontier of farmers’ 
profits. To deduce the water allocation, it suffices to characterize the Pareto frontier. Let S be the 
set of all feasible agreements. The Pareto frontier would be described by the solution to the 
  16following problem (which maximizes farmer 1’s profits holding fixed the profits of the other 
farmers): 
) 3 ( ,..., 2
, ) ( ) ( ) (
. .
) ( ) ( ) (
, 1 1 , , 1 1 , 1 ,
21 11 1 21 1 1 11 11 ) , ( , ( ) , 1
N j all for
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Adding the constraints in Eq.(3), we get 
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Rearrange Eq.(5) to have the entire water allocation from tubewell j ‘visible’: 
∑
=




j j j jj j j j j jj jj w w w w c w f A w f A Max
j j j jj
1
, 1 , 1 , 1 ) , ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( (
, 1 π (6) 
The first order conditions for an interior optimum are: 
. , ) ( ' , ) ( ' , 1 , 1 j c w f A c w f A j j j j jj jj ∀ = = + +        ( 7 )  
That is, the MVPW on each plot equals the unit cost of water extraction; every point on 
the Pareto frontier of farmers’ profits corresponds to agreements with the same, efficient water 
allocation described by Eq.(7). But the data show that MVPW greatly exceeds the unit cost of 
extraction on each plot (Section 3.1(2)); so, an appropriate model of a social contract in the 
village must take into account the fact that limited power supply rations the amount of water 
available, as it does in the modeling that follows. 
 
  17(2). The Social Contract Under Water Rationing 
  Suppose that the discharge from tubewell j is constrained to be at most  N j wj ,..., 1 , = . If 
, the solutions to Eq.(7) above, add up to a number greater than  j j jj w w , 1 , + j w , plots will be 
water-rationed; this is the case suggested by the data. Purely to simplify some expressions (those 
for the disagreement point in Nash Bargaining), we make a stronger assumption. 
(Assumption R):  N j c w f A j jj ,..., 1 , ) ( ' = ∀ > . That is, even if the entire amount discharged by 
tubewell j is applied to farmer j’s plot at that location, the MVPW on the plot exceeds the unit 
cost of water extraction. In the absence of an agreement of water price and water allocation, 
farmer j therefore gets a ‘disagreement’ profit  j j jj j w c w f A d − = ) (  (since without getting any 
water on his plot in location j – 1, its output is 0). 
The Pareto frontier of the set of profit possibilities is now characterized by: 
. .
) ( ) ( 1 1 21 1 1 11 11 ) ) , ( , ( , 1
t s
w c pw pw w f A w f A Max N N N S w w p j j j jj − − + + ∈ +  
N j w c pw pw w f A w f A j j j j j j j j j j jj jj ,..., 2 , ) ( ) ( 1 , , 1 1 , 1 , = ∀ = − − + + − + − − π  (8) 
. ,..., 1 , , 1 N j w w w and j j j jj = ∀ = + +        ( 9 )  
Here, the set S of feasible agreements consists of tuples of non-negative water price and 
water allocations that do not exceed the water available from each tubewell, and that result in 
each farmer’s profit being at least as large as his disagreement profit. It follows from Assumption 
R that all available water is utilized; so the constraints in Eq.(9) hold with equality. Carrying out 
the same operations that helped rewrite Eq.(3) in the form of Eq.(6), the above maximization 
problem can be posed as: 
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The first order conditions imply 
. ,..., 1 ), ( ' ) ( ' , 1 , 1 N j w f A w f A j j j j jj jj = ∀ = + +                            (11) 
That is, water in each location j  is allocated to equate MVPW on the plots in that 
location. Let this efficient water allocation be denoted  . Every point on the Pareto 
frontier of farmers’ profits therefore arises from this common, efficient water allocation 
(efficient subject to the water constraints). We now describe the Pareto frontier fully, followed 
by the Nash Bargaining solution for the problem. 




 Farmer  j’s profit at the efficient allocation is equal to 
j j
j j j j j j j j j jj jj j
ps
w w p w c w f A w f A
+ =







1 , 1 ,
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π
π
                        (12) 
where   equals his net water sales at the efficient water allocation, and  is his profit at this 
allocation, if the water price equals zero. The Nash Bargaining solution is a tuple of farmers’ 
profits  that solves 
j s 0
j π




) ( 1 ) ,..., ( 1 j j
N
j d Max
N − Π = Θ ∈ π π π                              (13) 
where  is the set of all profit tuples  Θ ) ,..., ( 1 N π π that lie on the Pareto frontier and satisfy 
. , j d j j ∀ ≥ π  In Nash Bargaining problems which divide a ‘surplus’ (such as here), and where 
the players can make arbitrary monetary transfers (that add up to 0) to each other, the Pareto 
frontier is an (N – 1) –dimensional hyperplane in the space  of the N-players’ payoffs. But in  N ℜ
  19our setting this is not the case, because the only transfers farmers can make is through payment 
of the water price; and the efficient water allocation creates sets of net water buyers and sellers. 
This restricts  to being a line segment in  , with direction determined by the identities of net 
water sellers versus buyers, as derived below. 
Θ N ℜ
Let  be the subsets of farmers that are respectively net 
buyers and net sellers of water, at the efficient water allocation. For a water price to be feasible, 
it must be non-negative, and satisfy   For feasible water prices to exist, it 
must be that for all net water buyers,  . We have that, at  the efficient water 
allocation, the set of feasible water prices is the closed interval [m,M], where
} 0 | { }, 0 | { ≥ = < = j j s j NS s j NB
. , 0 0 j d ps j j j ∀ ≥ − + π
0 0 > − j j d π
17
}} | / ) ( max{ , 0 max{ }, | / ) ( min{ 0 0 NS j s d m NB j s d M j j j j j j ∈ − − = ∈ − − = π π             (14) 
So a water price p > M implies that some net water buyer (at the efficient water allocation) is 
better off at his disagreement payoff than on agreeing to this price. Similarly, p < m means that 
some net water seller (at the efficient water allocation) is better off at his disagreement payoff 
than on an agreement at this price. Therefore, we have 
]} , [ | ) ,..., ( ) ,..., ( ) ,..., {( 1
0 0
1 1 M m p s s p N N N ∈ + = = Θ π π π π                     (15) 
This is a line segment through the point  , in the direction of  , the net 
water trades of the farmers. The Nash Bargaining objective function (Eq.(13)) is continuous on 
the compact set  , so a maximum (a Nash Bargaining solution) exists; it is unique because the 
objective is strictly quasiconcave. Thus, there is agreement on a unique water price 
) ,..., ( 0 0
1 N π π ) ,..., ( 1 N s s
Θ
]. , [ M m p∈  
                                                           
17 We assume m < M : this always holds if    . , 0 0 j d j j ∀ > − π
  20Since   lies entirely in the interior of the positive orthant, it is possible that the solution is at 
one of its 2 endpoints, corresponding to p equaling m or M. 
Θ
The model of the social contract has the following 3 implications, among others. First,  
the Nash Bargaining solution for the case of water rationing predicts that each tubewell allocates 
water efficiently across the plots it serves. In Section 5 below, we therefore first explore how 
closely this prediction is borne out by our analysis of the village data. Second, the Nash 
Bargaining solution restricts the water price p to an interval [m,M] that can in principle be 
determined, or at least estimated; however, this requires us to have plot and water allocation data 
for the entire village (not just a sample)
18. Note also that p is not necessarily higher or lower than 
the unit cost of water extraction, bearing out our criticism of using price-cost margins to infer 
water allocative efficiency, as done in the literature. Finally, in the absence of a water constraint, 
the Nash Bargaining solution predicts that water is allocated to each plot up to the point where its 
MVPW equals its marginal cost of extraction. In our Policy exercise in Section 5, we explore the 
effects of relaxing the power and water shortage, using this latter water allocation.   
 5    Implications of the Social Contract 
 5.1 Allocative Efficiency:  To begin assessing whether or not water allocation across plots is 
efficient, we compare the MPWs across plots. These MPW estimates are significantly different 
(in terms of our constructed confidence bands) from each other, suggesting, prima facie, 
allocative inefficiency. But in fact, the inefficiency is quite limited, particularly when we 
compare MPWs across plots serviced by the same tubewell (as suggested by the model). An 
analysis of variance of the MPWs shows that less than half the variation of the total sum of 
                                                           
18 Given output and input prices, water constraints, and the estimated production function on all plots, we can of 
course compute the water price at the Nash Bargaining solution, for comparison with the water price in the data. 
However, the two may differ simply because our model assumes symmetric bargaining power across farmers; so 
such a comparison is not meaningful. 
  21squares (9.6 of 20.6) is attributable to within-group variation (i.e. variation of MPWs across plots 
served by the same tubewell). The variation of MPWs on plots serviced by the same tubewell 
results in lower total output aggregated over those plots, relative to output corresponding to the 
efficient water allocation that equalizes MPWs across these plots. 
We estimate the extent of these output (and profit) losses by posing the following 
question. What would the outputs from the sample plots be if the total observed water from each 
tubewell in the sample is allocated efficiently across the plots that are serviced by that tubewell?  
Suppose for every plot i in the data set, the choice  of inputs other than irrigation has 
been made as in the data. Suppose the constant marginal cost of water extraction from tubewell t 
is  , and let U(t) be the set of all plots in the sample that are serviced by tubewell t. Let 
) ( ij x
t c t w be 
the total volume of water discharged from tubewell t: this is given from the data. An efficient 
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t iJ w x  captures the water shortage implied by limited electricity supply. 
Note that at the solution, MVPW will be equated across plots. We solve this problem, evaluated 
at the estimated parameter vector   and estimated production function and unit cost of water 
extraction, f, and  respectively, for each tubewell in the data set. Then we compare the total 
simulated output with the total output in the sample.  
β ˆ
t c ˆ
  22Note again that the mapping from tubewells to user plots stays the same as in the 
sample;
19 given that water is transported through unlined water channels, this mapping is largely 
determined by proximity of plots to particular tubewells.
20
As indicated in Table 5, redistributing water results in an average gain of less than 0.2 
quintals per bigha, with the highest gain of 1 quintal per bigha (a gain of about 2%; in value, 
Rs.102 per bigha) on plots which purchase water. We infer that the social contract appears to 
work extremely well, allocating water efficiently across plots, minimizing losses in overall yields 
in the face of water rationing. 
It may be worthwhile reiterating that thinking about tubewell owners as water selling 
firms trying to maximize profits (as done in much of the literature) does not fit well our setting in 
North India. Consider the following little thought exercise: suppose the tubewell owners in the 
data take the village level water price of Rupees 15 per hour as given; suppose also that water 
from each tubewell is constrained to be equal to the amount recorded in the data. Given these, 
suppose that starting from the sample water allocation, the tubewell owners reallocate water 
across plots serviced by their tubewells, in order to maximize profits from individual tubewell 
water sales. We ran this as a simulation and found, naturally, that given MVPWs on their own 
plots are greater than the water price in the sample, there is reallocation of water towards the 
tubewell owners’ plots, and away from water buying plots. Simulated output on plots with 
tubewells increases by 0.7 quintals per bigha on average, but average yields on plots that buy 
water drop from 53.7 to 16.30 quintals per bigha! This poor allocation results in overall yield in 
the village declining from 57.51 to 48.14 quintals per bigha. This exercise reinforces the fact that 
                                                           
19 So each plot serviced by the same tubewell faces the same marginal cost for water. Given water rationing, 
choosing a water allocation to maximize joint profits for these plots is the same as maximizing joint output. 
  23it is better to think about water allocation, at least in this large belt in North India, as arising out 
of a village-level social contract. 
5.2  Impact of Alternative Power Policy 
In earlier literature (and possibly different settings) in South Asia, a case has been made 
for engineering efficiency (or equity) enhancing redistributions in water allocation (e.g. Jacoby, 
Murgai, Rahman (2004)); in our setting, such policy is unnecessary. Instead, relaxing the water 
constraint will increase efficiency, as is clear from the model
21. But this will require improving 
power supply
22. The present system of an annual payment for a pump based on horsepower, 
however, does not give the power provider incentive to provide incremental power;
23 a system of 
unit pricing of electricity at remunerative levels can positively alter incentives. Improving power 
supply without unit pricing of electricity, even if this can be implemented, leads to a marginal 
cost of extracting water far below its social cost, and can lead to great overuse. Keeping these 
points in mind, we ask: 
 What would be the effect of unit pricing of power (at different levels), and reliable power supply, 
on yields, profits, irrigation volumes and power revenue? 
We are interested in finding out whether there are unit electricity prices that fetch a profit 
for the power provider (making it incentive compatible to provide reliable power), and yet are 
acceptable to farmers because the improved power supply adds to their crop yields and profits as 
well; and further, if at such unit power prices, irrigation volumes do not indicate much overuse 
relative to sample volumes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
20 This paper does not address questions of changes in water transport technology (such as a system of pipes); 
therefore, it is reasonable to retain the tubewell-user plot mapping as is. We found, though, that even allowing for 
unrestricted redistribution of water across all plots increases average yield by less than 0.5 quintals per bigha. 
21 Inadequate water arising out of power shortages also leads to improperly timed irrigations, and harms plant 
growth. This effect is not modeled or measured in this paper. 
22 Changes in the power policy regime have been advocated by several authors, on a number of counts. 
23 It is unreasonable to believe that reliable and adequate power can be provided by contract, in the present context. 
  24Modeling the Simulation: Each unit power price is translated into a unit cost of water 
extraction, the exact conversion depending on pump horsepower. Eq. (7) of Section 4 says that 
for water allocations determined by Nash bargaining, the absence of a water constraint will lead 
to MVPWs being equated to the unit cost of extraction.  Using this and the estimated production 
function and other input prices, we simulate optimal input choices for buyers and sellers of 
water, water allocation, and village averages for yield, profits, irrigation volumes and power 
revenue (see Appendix A.3 for details). 
Results of the Simulation. We vary the unit power price from Rs.1.80 (comparable to some 
estimates of average power generation costs in India; power transmission and distribution costs 
are additional), in increments of Rs. 0.1, to Rs.4.50 per kilowatt-hour (kWhr). The latter roughly 
corresponds to commercial (industrial) rates in several parts of the country.
24
An extract of the results is in Table 6. Sample values for yield, profit per bigha, irrigation 
volume per bigha and power revenue per bigha are respectively 58.22 quintals, Rs.2490 (profit 
per bigha would be Rs.2220, if pump horsepower was not underreported), 30 bigha-inches and 
Rs.270.
25 These are recorded in Table 6 as the “sample” scenario; for which the unit power price 
is zero (and there is a lump sum monthly charge of Rs.70 per reported horsepower). At a power 
price of Rs.4.50 per kW hour (close to rates charged to industry), irrigation volume is 30.23 
bigha-inches, yield is about 61 quintals, profits are Rs.2051, and revenue to the power provider is 
Rs.852. As the power price is lowered gradually to Rs.1.80, irrigation volume increases to about 
34.66 bigha-inches, yield increases slowly, to reach about 63.61 quintals, power revenue per 
bigha decreases to Rs.386.21. 
                                                           
24 Commercial rates also include a lump sum charge per kilowatt of sanctioned load. 
25 Profit is calculated as revenue minus wage cost, rental costs of tractors and oxen, fertilizer cost and water cost; 
and cost of power for tubewell owners. We do not subtract imputed land rent. Incidentally, in this area, there is very 
  25Note first that at 30.23 bigha-inches of irrigation, the yield of 61 quintals is 2.88 quintals 
above the sample yield of 58.22 quintals, for which irrigation is only slightly lower at 30.02 
bigha-inches. Part of this increase is attributable to higher input use in the simulation, relative to 
the sample; with positive cross-partial derivatives in the production function, this increases yield 
at the same level of water-use as in the sample.
26  Yield increments thereafter are slow and 
diminish at higher irrigation levels. 
Table 6 shows that for power prices up to Rs.2.50 per kWhr, farmers’ profits and the 
power supplier’s revenues are both greater than their sample values; the significantly higher 
simulated yields can therefore pay for electricity prices that cover the cost of power generation. 
In the present setup of lump sum power payments based on pump horsepower, there is 
widespread underreporting of horsepower. Accurate assessments of pump horsepower would 
decrease sample profits and increase sample power revenue by Rs.270 per bigha each. Under 
such an alternative baseline scenario, Table 6 suggests that power prices between Rs.2.70 and 
Rs.3.60 per kWhr are consistent with both profits and power revenue being larger than their 
baseline values.  
The simulation therefore implies that even in the presence of a social contract that results 
in a close-to efficient allocation of scarce water, a switch to remunerative power pricing is 
feasible, acceptable to both farmers and power providers, and will result in a substantial increase 
in yields. But water use is heavier than in the sample at power price levels that are politically 
acceptable at present.
27
                                                                                                                                                                                           
little land given out on rent. The wage cost includes an imputed wage for family labor, which can be quite important 
in several activities. 
26 The lower input use in the sample is likely because power and water were in shorter supply in the crucial summer 
months than later on. This led to lower application of fertilizers (which require water) and correspondingly of labor 
input. Our formal analysis, of course, lacks this timing aspect of farm activity. 
27 These simulations provide a lower bound on yield gains. Unreported simulations that set insignificant parameter 
estimates of the production to zero suggest that yield gains could be higher. Moreover, the reported simulation takes 
  266   Discussion and Conclusions 
The literature on water economics has many examples of water supply systems in the 
world pricing water at average rather than marginal cost, resulting in inefficiency (Schoengold 
and Zilberman(2005)). In this paper, however, we discover a village-level system with rigid 
trading prices having no bearing on marginal product, and yet a close to efficient water allocation 
governed by a social contract. This is more striking because the literature has often inferred the 
existence of local monopoly and inefficiency in similar settings of unlined water channels and 
reduced radii of operations of tubewells (Jacoby, Murgai, Rahman (2004)).  
Features such as land fragmentation and ownership of multiple plots that drive the 
usefulness of the social contract are widespread in India; it is a reasonable conjecture that 
efficient spatial water allocation, or something close to that, occurs elsewhere as well. The 
causes of inefficiency in groundwater irrigation lie elsewhere, and the policy debate should shift 
focus to address those (rather than worry about water allocations within villages). 
First, irregular and inadequate supply of power reduces crop yields by adversely affecting 
both the quantum and the timing of irrigations. Our simulations show that reliable power supply 
can improve yields by up to 10%;
28 the additional profits can more than pay for pricing power at 
unit cost. However implementing a change in the power regime is a challenge. The system of 
public ownership and political capture of power supply to agriculture needs to be replaced; but a 
discussion of the alternative combinations of private/public ownership, competition, regulation 
and realignment of expectations necessary to replace it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
acreage as given in the sample, but easier water availability would expand that. In addition, proper timing of 
irrigations is crucial for plant growth (Evenson, Pray and Rosegrant (1999)); inadequate power compromises this as 
well. But our aggregative analysis cannot quantify the amount of damage that is attributable to lack of timely 
irrigations. 
 
  27Switching from a non-remunerative power price–poor power supply regime to a higher price–
reliable supply one can be viewed as a move from a low-level to a high-level equilibrium (Spiller 
and Savedoff (1999)), and as is generally the case, moving from one to the other may involve 
institutional changes. 
Moving to a new power pricing regime has the added benefit of addressing the second, 
intertemporal, inefficiency embodied in over-extraction of groundwater. Traditional rights in 
India allow a land-owning farmer unlimited access to the groundwater beneath his land. The 
negative externality
29 on other aquifer users’ future pumping costs and foregone profits is likely 
exacerbated by the small size of landholdings, relative to aquifer area. While empirical study of 
this externality is beyond the scope of this paper, a companion paper suggests that a markup 
applied on the economic cost of power can tax the pumping of groundwater and align a farmer’s 
static private marginal cost of water extraction to its social cost. The socially optimal markup (in 
the steady state of a simple dynamic model) turns out to be about 15% of the unit cost of  
electricity.  Reforming the power sector can thus achieve the twin objectives of reliable power 
for greater agricultural productivity and sustainable groundwater use.   
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APPENDIX A. TECHNICAL DETAILS 
 
A.1.  Confidence Intervals for Marginal Product of Water 
 
In multiplicative form, the fitted value of Cobb-Douglas output on plot i evaluates to 
  .  Correspondingly, the estimate of marginal product of 
water (MPW) on the plot equals 
J c t t
iJ i
d d
i x x e x f
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(where   is the partial derivative of f with respect to   (the volume of water)). There is water 
rationing if the marginal value product is significantly greater than the water cost. To assess this, we 
construct for each plot i a 95% confidence band  around the MPW, using asymptotic theory. 
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where   is the transpose of the gradient of the function  (with respect to the parameter 
vector 
T
i J x f D ) , ( β β J f
β ), evaluated at  ) , ( β i x . Let  , or a consistent estimator of it. If   is 
asymptotically normal, we have 
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From Eq.(A.1.1) and (A.1.2) we get 
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Or, in simpler notation, 
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Replace  β  with   on the RHS in Eq.(A.2.3), and call the resulting variance  . Using this and 
Eq.(A.1.4), we have 
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From this we get the 95% confidence interval 
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A.2. Estimating Marginal Cost of Water Extraction from a Tubewell 
 
Farmers pay a lump sum annual electricity charge for running a tubewell. So the marginal cost of water 
extraction includes only those maintenance costs that depend on water output. Maintenance costs are 
essentially costs of repairing the pump set in the event of a breakdown. While the frequency of 
breakdowns is high due to power surges, what is germane here is that the number of breakdowns may 
depend on the number of hours that the tubewell operates. It also depends on whether the machine is a 
submersible (fewer breakdowns) or a non-submersible. We assume that the number of breakdowns 
follows a Poisson Process (see Ross (1997)) with parameters  2 1,µ µ  for submersibles and non-
submersibles respectively. Let  be the sets of submersibles and non-submersibles respectively. So, 
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Using Eq.(A.2.1) and data on total number of breakdowns and number of running hours for each 
submersible tubewell, we set up a likelihood function and get an estimate  1 ˆ µ for the Poisson parameter.  
 
Since the likelihood of the submersible sample  is 
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µ                                 (A.2.3) 
 
which is just the total (or average) number of submersible breakdowns in the data divided by the total (or 
average) number of hours that submersibles in the data ran for. A similar exercise yields the Poisson 
parameter estimate for non-submersibles. 
Suppose that it takes time  to extract 1 unit (bigha-inch) of water using submersible tubewell j.  j t
Then, the expected number of breakdowns in this time, 
j j t t N E 1 ˆ )) ( ( µ =           ( A . 2 . 4 )  
Our estimated marginal cost of water extraction from this tubewell is the above number times the average 
cost of repair. 
 
  32A.3.  Modeling the Policy Simulation (Section 5.2)  
 
Suppose farmer s owns plot s, and the tubewell t on it, and suppose that B(t) is the set of plots that buy 
water from this tubewell. With reliable power supply, the high density of tubewells, and the present 
aquifer depth of more than 100 feet, there is no water constraint. Suppose that farmer s’s optimal input 
choices are , and those for the water buyers are  (the  Jth input being 
water). The social contract in this ‘no water constraint’ case, discussed in Eq.(8-10) in the text, suggests 
that water would be allocated efficiently, which now translates to equating MVPW on any plot with the 
unit cost of water extraction  from tubewell t.  With price  for sugarcane, and  for other 
inputs, we can solve for the optimal input choices of farmer s as follows: 
) ˆ ), ˆ (( sJ sj x x ) ( ) ˆ ), ˆ (( t B i iJ ij x x ∈
t c s p J j q j ≠ ,
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And similarly for all plots  ,  ) (t B i∈
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j
ij j iJ ij s iJ ij x c x q x x f p x x − − ∈ ∑ β      (A.3.2) 
That is, the optimization problems of the different plots can be solved separately, because there is no 
common water constraint like in Simulation 1. From the solutions to plot level optimization problems, we 
derive per bigha averages for ouput, profit, irrigation volume, and power revenue, and compare them with 
the baseline numbers observed in the data. 
Basic Assumptions: In the data set, tubewell pump set owners are charged Rupees 70 per 
horsepower per month. Most farmers misreport pumps to have 10 horsepower, so annual charges are 
about Rupees 8700 (8400 + other minor charges). But in actual fact, almost all pumps run on 20 
horsepower.
30 We base our simulations on this fact. Thus a unit power price of y rupees per kW hour 
translates to approximately 15y rupees per hour, for a 20 horsepower pump.
31 Dividing this by the 
discharge from the tubewell, and adding to that the estimated marginal cost of water extraction from this 
tubewell in the absence of unit pricing of electricity (as in the data),
32 we get a simulated unit cost of 
extracting 1 bigha-inch of water from it. With the extraction costs from each tubewell in place, and other 
input and output prices as given in the sample, we endow each plot with the estimated production 
technology, and allow each plot in the sample to choose labor, tractor and oxen hours, and irrigation 
volumes, in order to maximize profits as described by Eqs.(A.3.1) and (A.3.2).
33 Note that we hold fixed 
the mapping of tubewell to user plot; this determines specific water costs for each plot. 
                                                           
30 Given the shortage of electricity to pump water, farmers compensate by having more tubewells and horsepower 
than would otherwise be necessary, in order to pump up water as quickly as possible.  
31 Since 1 horsepower is approximately ¾ of a kilowatt. Unless the pump is simply idling, a running 20 HP pump 
consumes close to that. 
32 As reported earlier,  the estimated marginal costs of extraction for non-submersibles and submersibles pumpsets 
average to, respectively, Rs. 1.45 and Rs. 0.3 per bigha-inch of water.  
33 Acreage and the variables with insignificant estimates (Table 3) are not optimized over. 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics on Water Use and Yields 
 





Average electricity costs (Rs.) per year  9665  9012 
Average number of times repairs were effected  1.5  3.2 
Average maintenance costs (Rs.)  per year  3356  6151 
Average time taken to irrigate one bigha (minutes)  90  120 
 
1.2. Irrigation Details, by Category of Plot 




Number of plots  240  86 
Mean number of irrigations  10.2  8.0 
% plots receiving 5 irrigations before 31 July 
(start of monsoon) 
67 37 
 
1.3. Yields of Sugarcane, by Category of Plot (Quintals per Bigha) 
  Plots with own 
tubewell 
Plots with purchased 
water 
Overall   59  53 
Sandy loam soils  59  52 
Loam soils  58  58 




Table 2: Summary Statistics of  Other Inputs and Output Variables (326 observations) 
Variable Mean  Standard  Deviation  Min  Max 
Output (quintals)  443  430.16  30  4000 
Plot Area (bighas)  7.5  6.2078  1  50 
Labor (hours)  1302  1189.12  178  9190 
Manure (quintals)  116  228.42  neg  2520 
Fertilizers (value)  1704.2 1686.36  81  10915 
Tractor(hours) 7.9  22.15  neg  200 
Oxen(hours) 86.4  99.617  neg  568 
Irrigation (bigha-
inches) 
222.5 208.59  5.2  1330 
Conversion: 1 bigha = 0.2 acres. 1 bigha-inch = 20.6 cubic meters. 
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Table 3. Cobb-Douglas Production Function Estimates (Variables in logs) 
Output Coefficient  Standard  Error  t-ratio 
Plot Area  0.742***    0.0444      16.71    
Labor  0.076***  0.0287      2.65   
Manure           0.001  0.0060   0.23    
Fertilizers         - 0.028     0.0177     -1.58   
Tractor  0.091***   0.0176       5.14    
Oxen 0.125***  0.0177  7.07 
Irrigation 0.064***  0.0246  2.61 
Crop Dummy 
(1=rattoon) 
0.486*** 0.0416  11.70 
Farmer Dummies  ** and ***     
Constant 2.996***  0.1749  17.13 
Other information on the Cobb-Douglas Estimation: Number of Observations: 326; F(16,309) = 396.47; Prob > F = 
0.0000; R-squared=0.9536; Adjusted R-squared=0.9511. ** and *** denote 5% and 1% levels of significance. 
 
Table 4A. Estimates for Marginal Value Product of Water (MVPW) (Incremental Rs.  per 
Incremental Bigha-Inch), with 95% Confidence Intervals; Water Price (Rs. per Bigha-Inch) 
 







Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
MVPW All  326  16.63  25.753  4.455  91.902 
Conf. int: R  All  326  16.67  25.800  4.466  92.086 
Conf. int: L  All  326  16.60  25.705  4.444  91.729 
Water Price  All  326  6.53  2.12  2.77  13.64 
*: After dropping 2 outliers. Conf. int. L and R are left and right endpoints of confidence intervals. 
TW=tubewell. Conversion: Rs.50=$1. 1 bigha-inch = 20.6 cubic meters. 
. 
 
Table 4B. Mean Marginal Value Product of Water by Plot Type` 
 
Variable Plot  Type  Mean 
MVPW  Own TW   11.872 
Conf. int: R  Own TW  11.899 
Conf. int: L  Own TW  11.844 
MVPW Buy  water  18.434 
Conf. int: R  Buy water  18.476 
Conf. int: L  Buy water  18.392 
          Conf. int. L and R are left and right endpoints 





  35Table 5. (Section IV): What Would be Profits and Output from the Sample Plots if the Total 
Observed Water From each Tubewell in the Sample is Allocated Efficiently Across the Plots that are 
Serviced by that Tubewell? 
 






All Plots  58.22  +0.18  +18.36 
Plots with Single-Owner TW  59.17  -0.04  -4.08 
Plots that bought water  53.58  +1.0  +102.0 
 
Yield = quintals of sugarcane per bigha; Value = Rs. per bigha; Sample Area=2350 bighas. TW=tubewell. 
Conversion: 1 quintal=100kg. Rs.50=$1. 1bigha = 0.2 acres.  
 
 
Table 6. Policy Simulation: Effect of Unit Power Price on Yields, Irrigation Volumes, 
Profits 
Power Price  Yield  Profits  Irrigation Volume  Power Revenue 






1.8  63.6051 2655.8063 34.6596  386.2131 
2.1  63.4592 2596.2295 33.5920  437.3032 
2.3  63.2845  2552.9979    33.0832  472.3410 
2.5  63.2084 2514.1835 32.6242  506.6724 
2.7  63.0827 2472.6266 32.2906  542.3565 
2.9  63.0196 2434.2964 31.9595  576.9297 
3.1  62.9608 2396.2129 31.6714  611.5009 
3.3  62.5901 2342.0245 31.1676  643.0514 
3.5  62.5433 2304.4084 30.9738  677.8705 
3.7  61.7818 2231.8122 30.5666  708.5204 
3.9  61.0862 2163.0638 30.4730  744.6356 
4.1  61.0602 2125.6163 30.3827  780.5405 
4.3  61.0355 2088.2412 30.3008  816.4444 
4.5  61.0120 2050.9319 30.2262  852.3476 
 
Units: Power Price: Rs. per kilowatt hour; Yield: Quintals per bigha; Profits: Rupees per bigha 
Irrigation Volume: bigha-inches (per bigha); Power Revenue: Rs. per bigha. 
Conversion: Rs. 50=$1; 1 bigha = 0.2 acres; 1 bigha-inch=20.6 cubic meters. The sample profits and power revenue 
per bigha are starred, as profits are higher and power revenue lower due to farmers underreporting the horsepower of 
their pumps. Correct reporting would result in the profits and power revenue given in parentheses, below the starred 
levels in row 1. 
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